A: What's about Boethius's debate of bad fortune and good fortune. How is wicked fortune preferable than good fortune?
B: A human who was born into an aristocratic family, with forces of intellect and a famous reputation, who never wished for money, practiced grand mercy and promotion for much of his life may well have had disrespect for earthly properties and accomplishments. It is substantial that human remembers that the treats of fortune are unsteady and can be easily occupied away. After fate, the soul will research back on what was so remarkable in life and reflect it to be unsavory.
In this existence, it is probably preferable for the soul to have an evil fortune, for that does not yoke the spirit as much as good fortune makes. Philosophy debates that the enjoyment of having a bedder to function hard work, is not essentially "good" - after all, when bedder makes an injury, we are responsible, but when a bedder makes right we cannot claim the confidence. The man who entertains good fortune is driven with anxiety, running this path and trying to preserve what he has.
Good fortune can drive men into error behavior, bilking them about what to anticipate from life. When Fortune is cruel, it pulls men back to a perception of what the universe is like, and who their companions are. Philosophy shows that evil fortune awards another fantastic gift; the awareness of one's true companions, friends who truly love someone.
A: Debate Boethius' notion of the supreme good and correct happiness.
B: The Consolation of Philosophy is a prolonged screening of the kind of happiness. Brought low by the rotation of fortune’s gear, Boethius wants to fluctuate within his muse, Philosophy, for an explication of his bad luck and asks her to offer him what actual happiness is. The debate and reasons that ensue are convoluted. It is troublesome to define what, exactly, Philosophy asks about the kind of real happiness: Does she debate that fortune is an essential ingredient of real happiness, or does she dispute that right happiness is independent of fortune and totally self-sufficient?
Suggest another road, does Philosophy in the end claim that Boethius can be glad without the treats of fortune, or does she ask that he is really unable to find something worth mourning? Philosophy follows on to demonstrate that what many in the universe think of as good; respect (honor), strength, independence from need(wealth), reputation, enjoyment, or those with puzzled or complex passions, such as the willingness for wealth for the intention of power and enjoyment, or force for the aim of money and reputation, and even those who want a wife and children for the entertainment they get. Strength and Beauty of the body award power and fame. All of these passions are for true happiness. She starts by debating that the human’s ultimate target is real happiness. She further debates that God, in morality of his figure, must be specified with the highest good. She understands that, since God and welfare are both the highest good, “God is happiness itself.”
Thus, according to the monolithic consideration, real happiness stays in a space which is untouchable by the illusions of fortune. The treats of fortune are not needful conditions of this form of monolithic happiness. Philosophy asks that mortals trick themselves if they anticipate to gain true happiness over the treats of fortune. She thinks that things such as honor, riches, kingdoms, glitter, and physical enjoyment “seem to give mortals images of the true good, perhaps, or some imperfect goods, but the true and perfect good they cannot bestow.” Since the treats of fortune are not essential for real happiness, then Boethius, according to the monolithic respect, has no cause to mourn his disaster. He has missed nothing of any real value.
Philosophy moves through each of the assumed wares of earth. Physical fairness is a fancy, formed by the other people's willingness to sight grace in the body. Moreover, somatic strength and beauty are easily and readily lost, by time and sickness. Wealth is an origin of anxiety. A man in high position welcomes honor, but the position does not give a value for the owner. Often, Philosophy says, high office originates depravity and pollutes rather than raises the officeholder. If a king has a force, the steady gaining of more power would fetch more happiness. But there is no control on ground which governs all of humanity, so the inseparable scarcity of power in power itself awards misadventure on those with force.
Philosophy conceives the treats of fortune from three diverse corners. She debates that the treats of fortune are neither instrumentally worthy nor adequate for real happiness because they are temporal, they cannot relate to us and they are not essentially good. Each of these sides of Philosophy’s debate awards a destructive consideration of what she later calls is an essential characteristic of right happiness. Philosophy debates that fortune can never give rise to real happiness purely because the kind of fortune is totally paradoxical to the kind of right happiness. True happiness, she calls, is the grand excellence, and the grand excellence cannot be possessed away. The treats of fortune, on the other side, can be possessed away. Since valid happiness and the treats of fortune are extensively different, the treats of fortune will not be appropriate for real happiness, nor they will be instrumentally worthy for the individual who demands valid happiness.
Fame, in reality, is a deceptive thing, nothing is more deceptive than unfair reputation. Also, the reputation of an individual being can never be distributed to all the inhabitance of the universe, just as force can't be over all world. Fame of family doesn't also award a virtue. Bodily enjoyment is of the least interest to Philosophy. Philosophy inspects it with disrespect, and tells that its "pursuit is full of anxiety and its fulfillment full of remorse." It is harmful to health, and even the valuable enjoyment of a wife and kids can also get many disasters. Because these wares are not ideal, they are incapable to award typical welfare to any individual being.
She debates that real happiness is similar with God and the Good. She assumes that because an incomplete Good lives, there must also remain “a steadfast and perfect good.” Furthermore, since God also owns the ideal Good, God and this Good must be similar. Finally, since real happiness and the Good are similar, “true happiness is located in this highest God." With this debate, Philosophy shifts beyond arguing the kind of actual happiness in unfavorable terms to a more specified definition. She debates that the constancy that the treats of fortune deficiency is a defining feature of the notions of which real happiness is involved: the Good that must remain is “steadfast,” and God is endless. Like Philosophy’s debates about the volatile kind of the treats of fortune, her debate of their externality assists to build a negative determination of real happiness. By the end of Book II, we realize both that real happiness cannot be temporal and that it is not constructed in things outward to the logical human entity. In Book III, Philosophy evolves the final demand in positive expressions. She debates that one of the features of valid happiness that it is unlike the foreign treats of fortune (but like the logical human being), it is “one and simple by nature” and “has no parts."
This outcome dovetails carefully with Philosophy’s later debate that real happiness is the grand Good. If it is the status that the treats of fortune are not substantially Good, then, we want to request, what is? Philosophy’s answer to this potential issue is to discuss that real happiness is itself the Good. All individual beings, she says, “strive to reach only one single goal: true happiness. And that is the good thing. . . . It is in fact the highest of all good things and it contains all good things within itself." The debate of the inefficiency of the treats of fortune for real happiness in Book II supplies a passive characterization of real happiness, while Book III supplies a favorable determination of true welfare as God and the Good.
Since in each type of being there is a supreme potential good, and since individual being too is a confirmed type of being, there must be a supreme potential good for a person, not a utility which is supreme in the whole sensation, but one that is supreme for a person. The goods which are attainable to a person are restricted and do not expand to infinity. By means of cause we will demand to define what the supreme Good is which is attainable to man. Boethius recognizes the Supreme Good with God, with happiness and the final origin of all happiness.
All goods found in the universe and contributing to gladness are just sides of God’s goodness. It is self-obvious to Boethius that supreme goodness can only be understood in God, as God is the supreme ideal being, than whom no more ideal. It is also self-clear that the Supreme Good is happiness, or perfect happiness, since ideal happiness lives in God and is similar with God. On the other hand, this Supreme Good is a man, and the best road of reaching this man and getting in attitude therewith is a position of humility and devotion. Real happiness is the continuation of God over mental and religious means. The supreme good is conceived by Boethius, and the only good utility is pursuing. All physical goods are dummy goods, only our soul and brains can lead us to the real good of the spirit: God.
A: Elaborate on the penalty of evil men.
B: Evil people are far more sad when they miss punishment, than when they are justly corrected. It is clear that evil people should be punished, and unequal that they should get-away punishment. Boethius asks how evil can occur in a world formed by God, but lady Philosophy debates that there is no reasoning that evil still exists. People make wicked things because they wish some utility in them, but God gave us independent will. God does not have the force to do wickedness, people do. In this cognition, the wicked lose their human kind for evil and they have dropped to the grade of beasts. But this procures, in Book IV, to a clear request: If the universe is dominated by the good and all things demand the good, why are some people wicked, and furthermore, why do evil people so often appear to succeed while the good torture?
Philosophy’s responses are strange. First she debates that the wicked are indeed weaker than the virtuous, since all people demand the good and therefore the wicked fail to attain that which they attain after, while the virtuous succeed. She then debates that the wicked are sad, since she has already demonstrated that welfare is the good and the wicked miss to win the good, and so fail to attain happiness. Finally, Philosophy manifests that the wicked do in fact receive forfeit in this life by making the wickedness that they set out to make, which is a pain in itself. And because good people make virtue, they become even more pure , which is in itself a reward. Actually, if happiness is the ultimate good that all men demand, what other things would there be?
Men who are wicked cannot gain the definitive goal. Wickedness is the deficiency of power to make good, therefore the wicked are depressed. The forfeit of wicked people is only therefore valid, so they are still cured with some medicines. If a wicked person bypasses forfeit, he will be not as lucky as one who is disciplined because he is at minimum receiving good. Evil is an illness of the body and the brain—thus far, we should sympathize with evil people. If the wicked are disciplined, it is useful because they have an opportunity to clean themselves from that pollution and changing their actions. When they get rid of forfeit, the probability of their evil increases. But Boethius doesn't discover this line of logic persuasive. He still discovers that there is some goodness in the mercy of fate. Clearly, there appears to be some wickedness in the reality that good men can be depressed by the wicked. Some wicked acts of wicked men are permitted to reach to fruition. And so, for the rest of Book IV, Philosophy picks a completely distinct route in arguing for godly providence.
She differentiates between “fate” and “providence”, where providence is a plain unity in God’s brain and fate is the diverse outworking of providence in the universe. Philosophy utilizes this difference to demonstrate that providence is beyond the capacity of individual beings to recognize, basically saying that there is a definitive outline behind anything even if we can’t sight what it is. But she also creates several trials at explication for why bad things occur to good people. In some situations, for example, evil things occur to the virtuous to examine their virtue and patience, or to support them. On the contrary, the wicked are occasionally permitted to succeed in order to restrict them from even greater evil, or to award them the capability to discipline other wicked people, or even to fetch them to the final destruction.
A: With respect to Boethius, what is divine knowledge?
B: Upon finishing The Consolation of Philosophy, I would declare that it's secret radical is godly providence. Boethius debates that divine awareness does not puncture upon human liberty because it is clearly distinct from human awareness. Along the route, as he is explaining the concept of godly providence, Boethius is withdrawn into a discussion of how godly awareness and individual free wish connect.
For Boethius, God’s eternality denotes more than that he is never going to die. Therefore, godly awareness is not really awareness at all – at minimum not in any direction like transient creatures can visualize awareness. The difference between awareness and freedom is perceived by understanding the distinction between God’s awareness as One who is external and our awareness as people in time. Thus far, we must struggle to link our soul with God through devotion. We are transient creatures, and we can only recognize things in a transient way. God, Boethius emphasizes, is external of time. He determines God’s timeless existence as eternal, and God viewing all times as the present.
In other statements, if God views all time as the present-day, then his awareness is wrong. But all times with respect to god are present, and so awareness is purely monitoring of the present. His notion of timelessness stresses one to adopt his thoughts about the naivety of godly awareness. Rather than looking ahead into coming time, God realizes all incidents at the same time. And since Boethius has explained that awareness of present incidents is not definitive, God’s awareness is clearly monitoring. In this technique, Boethius harmonizes godly awareness and human independent will, without killing our moral accountability before God.
A: How do you relate The Consolation of Philosophy to your own realities?
B: The Consolation of Philosophy takes a memorable position in a long range of literary, divine and political works manufactured by writers who were jailed and carried out for their persuasions and whose talks stimulated the central nervous systems of later writers to take a higher dose of caffeine by truth and equity in order to be energetic and happy people. In spite of fact that Boethius was not the first man to record an account of unfair imprisonment, his Consolation shares in a rich imitation of literary jobs, both autobiographical and imaginary, treating with the trial of imprisonment and the search for human liberty.
Boethius’s existence and occupation show a Christian intellectual according to the traditional heritage whose fortunes were inverted in an instant. He collapsed from the high civilian position to the bottoms of jail, where he expected the king’s command of fulfillment. Boethius, suggesting that welfare is an object that once accomplished cannot be removed, enlists the support of Philosophy, in defining what true gladness consists in and how we might gain true happiness. After all, people search for welfare along diverse routes. Some demand treasure; others demand to be respected; some demand strength; others demand reputation; and many demand those objects that supply them with enjoyment.
The debate of the inefficiency of the treats of fortune for real happiness in Book II supplies a passive characterization of real happiness, while Book III supplies a favorable determination of true welfare as God and the Good. Since in each type of being there is a supreme potential good, and since individual being too is a confirmed type of being, there must be a supreme potential good for a person, not a utility which is supreme in the whole sensation, but one that is supreme for a person. The goods which are attainable to a person are restricted and do not expand to infinity. By means of cause we will demand to define what the supreme Good is which is attainable to man.
Boethius recognizes the Supreme Good with God, with happiness and the final origin of all happiness. All goods found in the universe and contributing to gladness are just sides of God’s goodness. It is self-obvious to Boethius that supreme goodness can only be understood in God, as God is the supreme ideal being, than whom no more ideal. It is also self-clear that the Supreme Good is happiness, or perfect happiness, since ideal happiness lives in God and is similar with God. On the other hand, this Supreme Good is a man, and the best road of reaching this man and getting in attitude therewith is a position of humility and devotion. Real happiness is the continuation of God over mental and religious means. The supreme good is conceived by Boethius, and the only good utility is pursuing. All physical goods are dummy goods, only our soul and brains can lead us to the real good of the spirit: God.
A: How can The Consolation of Philosophy become pertinent to our existing realities?
B: I have summarized my viewpoint on individual nature and welfare in my previous papers. Simply, people demand security, rest and welfare in life. The truth is that each of these is a fiction. Regardless of faith, sex, social or financial position, every one of us wishes to be glad and it is the popular requirement that links us together. All our trials are prepared towards finding welfare and relieving pain. The heaven of God is said to be persistent without any handicap. This denotes that God is in continuous status of gladness derived from constant pleasure.
God created this world for the intention of entertainment. This creation consists of both welfare and suffering which are altering constantly. The origination is totally in the hand of God who could have produced this creation with persistent glad scenes only. Anything persistent leads to boring, which is the bale. Therefore, bale is inevitable even if the welfare is constant. Hence, the origination compromises alternating welfare and misery. And thus far, the summarized concept is that God enjoys both welfare and bale and therefore, His joy is constant. People who think that god is the originator of this world and individual being, discover a shelter in our religion. I think in god, and as a Muslim individual, I can’t disguise that whenever I sense distant from my faith, I begin feeling shaky and really worn.
Why do I think that God is the origin of true welfare? It’s because he is graceful and he is always alongside me whenever I’m in the heart of problem. Welfare reaches from the security inside, because once the combat inside us is terminated, our eyes begin seeing the universe variously, by appreciating our survival and everything around us. With respect to me, faith gives me this security that assists me to continue in this tiring life. God Rule of spirit is within each one of us. The spirit is the God and one of the features of God, is permanent Bliss. Bliss is the welfare which is not dependent on any foreign stimulus. In the orientation of our spiritual advance, we can detect that permanent happiness. The type and amount as well as the period of trial of the Bliss are immediately relative to the phase of our spiritual development. By beginning spiritual pursuit and making harmonious efforts to proliferate it; we are able to discover Bliss constantly.